by Max Barry

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by The thaindom of the shire. . 98 reads.

Draft Brief

1. Advisory Opinion
No

2. Parties
The thaindom of the shire
Ewereni

3. Procedural History
No procedural history.

4. Facts
During the recent UCN Political Party Membership Registration Poll (see: page=poll/p=178046), The thaindom of the shire applied to join the Conservative Christian Alliance, a registered political party of the UCN.

On the RMB, the following exchange between The thaindom of the shire and [nation]Ewereni[/natin] ensued:

The thaindom of the shire wrote:Is it legal for a political party to deny membership based on denomination?

Ewereni wrote:In the Political Parties Act 2019 it says:
2.2 The leadership of a political party may exercise discretion in determining its membership.

I'm the President of the party - I get to decide.

I will continue to deny you membership of the Conservative Christian Alliance. Only bible-believing, orthodox Christians will be accepted as members of the party. You do not believe in the Bible, you are not an orthodox Christian so YOU ARE NOT A CHRISTIAN. I will just continue to deny your membership in the Conservative Christian Alliance - OUR PARTY DOESN'T WANT YOU.

Membership of the party has been denied by Ewereni, who is the Party President, as The thaindom of the shire has not been added as a member on the party's factbook.

5. Issue
The reason for denying membership was explained in this statement: 'You do not believe in the Bible, you are not an orthodox Christian so YOU ARE NOT A CHRISTIAN. '

This reasoning is unconstitutional because every resident is guaranteed the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief. The reason for denying membership was based on The thaindom of the shire religious belief which infringes their freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination, in this case, descrimination based on religious belief.

Ewereni's post was also intended to harm and bully which is demonstrated by 'OUR PARTY DOESN'T WANT YOU'. This was unnecessary and is bullying behaviour.

The accusations were also not true and were these untruths were done to be malicious and harm The thaindom of the shire.

In a separate matter, the party is set up to promote a particular Christian sub-branch or group, Conservative Christians and the Christian Right which is not legal. Its policies also discriminate against women, LGBT+ people and those with a narrow set of religious beliefs.

6. Rule

Constitution
4.1 The following rights and freedoms shall be guaranteed to all:

1. Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
4. Freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination.

27.1 Any resident may found or join a political party.
27.4 Provisions shall be made in law for the establishment, functioning, closure and regulation of political parties.

Political Parties Act 2019
4.1 All activities of political parties shall be consistent with the laws of the Union of Christian Nations.
4.2 No party shall be established to promote a particular Christian denomination, sub-branch or group in name or in practice.

Criminal Code Act 2020
4.3.1 Discrimination - Anyone who directly or indirectly treats or proposes to treat someone unfavourably because of a personal characteristic or attribute which is protected by the law and/or other authorities,
Shall be guilty of the misdemeanour of Discrimination.
4.3.2 Personal characteristics and attributes shall include but not be limited to: Age, sex, religious belief or activity, political belief or activity, sexual orientation, marital status, race including colour, nationality, citizenship, national origin, descent or ancestry, disability including physical, intellectual, cognitive or psychological disabilities, or personal association with a person who has any of these attributes.

7. Application
Whilst Party Presidents have broad discretion in determining membership of their political parties (see Political Parties Act 2019), this discretion must be exercised in a way that is consistent with the law and upholds each resident's constitutional rights and freedoms. Whilst The thaindom of the shire is a Christian, this fact is irrelevant as Ewereni used religious belief as a test to determine membership, despite The thaindom of the shire expressing assent to the policies and ideology of the party through selecting the Conservative Christian Alliance in the poll. The thaindom of the shire was thus subjected to discrimination which is prohibited by the Constitution.

This act of discrimination is also also illegal - see: s.4.3.1 Criminal Code Act 2020. Religious belief or activity is listed as a characteristic that someone cannot use to discriminate. The discrimination was also direct as evidence by Ewereni's post.

Lastly, the Conservative Christian Alliance promotes the Christian Right and Christian Conservatism, which both are sub-branches and groups within Christianity. This contravenes s.4.2 of the Political Parties Act 2019 which says a party cannot be organised around the promotion of Christian sub-branches and groups. The party also calls for: 'homosexuality, transgenderism and feminism to not be protected by anti-discrimination laws, and preferably criminalized.' This breaches the freedom from discrimination as well as overriding the religious beliefs of many who support feminism and are LGBT+ affirming based on their faith.

8. Conclusion
We are seeking for the Court to rule that:
1. Ewereni's comments attempted to constrain The thaindom of the shire's freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
2. Ewereni's comment shall be characterised as bullying and decision to reject party membership based on religion and belief was discriminatory and thus breached was a breach of The thaindom of the shire's Constitutional freedom and was not a valid exercise of section 2.2 of the Political Parties Act 2019.
3. Ewereni's is guilty of the misdemeanor of Discrimination as per ss4.3.1 & 4.3.2 of the Criminal Code Act 2020. We are requesting this be classified at a level 2 penalty and request an official public apology, the supression or removal of the offending post, an RMB/Discord ban of 30 days and the removal of Ewereni as an Elder and that he be prohibited from holding elected office for 6 months.

4. That the Conservative Christian Alliance and any successor parties be permanently deregistered for breaching section 4.2 of the Political Parties Act 2019 and for breaching rights and freedom 1&4 for promoting homophobic, transphobic and sexist policies alongside deliberately discriminating on religious belief.

9. Representation
Librerepublic as Attorney

10. Conflict of Interest
N/A

11. Constitutional Brief

In The thaindom of the shire v Ewereni [2021], UCN Supreme Court 2 (Part 1) the court ruled on the Constitutional parts of this case. Recital 34 states the following:

[34] Therefore, this Supreme Court defines that:

(i) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 4.1.1 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Recital [19] of this ruling.

(ii) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 4.1.4 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Recital [28] of this ruling.

(iii) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 27.1 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Considering [33] of this ruling.

For reference, the mentioned Recitals all concur with and support my arguments on the matter. A link will be included to the dispatch for the Court to review the matter.

The thaindom of the shire v Ewereni [2021], UCN Supreme Court 2 (Part 1)

OVERVIEW

Case: The thaindom of the shire v Ewereni [2021], UCN Supreme Court 2 (Part 1).
Judges: Eluney (Chief Justice), Christadelphians (Associate Justice) and Austrin (Associate Justice).
Plaintiff / Legal representative: The thaindom of the shire - Attorney General and Chaplain (non-denominational) / Librerepublic - Elder and Director of the Office of Culture and Wellbeing.
Defendant / Legal representative: Ewereni - Elder and Director of the Office of Media & Communications / Eco-Paris Reformation - Europe’s Ambassador to the Union of Christian Nations.
Case Type: Dispute.
Judgement Delivered: December 8, 2021.

BACKGROUND

On October 22 2021, The thaindom of the shire, Attorney General and Chaplain (non-denominational) of the Union of Christian Nations (hereinafter, the UCN) sent a telegram to Eluney, Chief Justice of the UCN with a copy of his submission related to a dispute that arose between him and Ewereni, Elder and Director of the Office of Media & Communications, arising out of the refusal of the defendant, in his capacity as President of The Conservative Christian Alliance (hereinafter, the CCA), to affiliate him as party member and for the reasons expressed in the Regional Message Board (hereinafter, the RMB). In that same submission, The thaindom of the shire appointed Librerepublic as his legal representative. In his first submission, the plaintiff stated the following:

That same day, the defendant was notified of the lawsuit.

Between October 23 and 26, and given the complexity and novelty of the issue to be resolved, the 3 judges of the Supreme Court debated what would be the procedure to follow. This, in view of the fact that although the case required establishing whether the defendant had breached the Political Parties Act 2019 and the Criminal Code Act 2020, the constitutional scope of various rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the UCN had to be previously resolved. Thus, it was concluded that the Supreme Court would define, in a first stage and in exercise of its original jurisdiction (article 20.1 of the Constitution), the scope of the constitutional rights that the plaintiff alleges were denied by the defendant. On the other hand, and in a second stage, the Supreme Court will determine whether Ewereni breached the Political Parties Act 2019 and the Criminal Code Act 2020.

On October 26, and based on the UCN Judiciary Standard Procedure, the plaintiff was required to send, within a period of 3 business days, his arguments regarding what should be the scope of the constitutional rights that he alleged were denied, that is: (i) Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (article 4.1.1 of the Constitution); (ii) Freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination (article 4.1.4 of the Constitution); (iii) Any resident may found or join a political party (Article 27.1 of the Constitution). However, and at the request of the plaintiff based on the UCN Judiciary Standard Procedure, it was granted an additional period of 2 business days to submit his arguments, which were finally sent on October 30 as follows:

"(…) This is the first submission regarding the case: The thaindom of the shire v Ewereni [2021], UCN Supreme Court 2.

In this submission I will:

1. Outline what the plaintiff believes to be the scope of these rights and freedoms

2. Apply this to the facts in this case.

3. Provide a recommendation to the Court on how these should be applied.

SECTION 1

In this section, I will define and outline the scope of each of these Constitutional rights and freedoms and provide an explanation as relevant.

#1 – Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
Scope: This freedom protects the right to religious belief but also to atheistic, philosophical and non-theistic beliefs and the right to freely hold and profess such beliefs. This is simultaneously an individual right – the freedom to adopt or hold a belief; and a collective right – the freedom to manifest that belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.

#4 – Freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination.

Scope: All residents shall be protected from any speech, action, law, proposal or behaviour that amounts to bullying and/or discrimination. Anyone who engages in bullying and/or discrimination shall be found as breaching this right.

Bullying is behaviour where words or actions are intentionally used against someone or a group of people to cause distress and/or risk to their wellbeing. These actions are usually done in a way to make someone else feel less valued, powerful or helpless.

Discrimination is the direct or indirect treatment or proposal to treat someone unfavourably because of a personal characteristic or attribute. This includes bullying someone because of a protected attribute or characteristic.

Protected characteristics/attributes – We argue for a dynamic approach to the scope of personal characteristics which is assed based on the facts presented before the Court with the Court guided by regional policy and legislation, the Interregional Anti-Bullying & Discrimination Accord (IABDA) and the Constitution of South Africa as authoritative guides.
Explanation: The definition of bullying and discrimination has been taken form the Interregional Anti-Bullying & Discrimination Accord (IABDA) which serves as the foremost interregional authority on these matters. Instead of listing a set of personal characteristic, I believe a more dynamic approach should be employed, understanding that as circumstances arise and the region’s standards change, an exhaustive list that lasts the test of time is almost impossible. Instead, we argue that when determining whether someone has been bullied or discriminated against based on a personal characteristic, the Court should turn to respected authoritative sources such as regional policy and law to understand the Region’s position as well as to Section 9 of the Constitution of South Africa, which is the only constitution in the world that expressly outlines prohibited grounds of discrimination and therefore has the most advanced constitutional jurisprudence in this area.

27.1 – Any resident may found or join a political party

Scope: The right of a resident to found or join a political party is absolute unless there is a Constitutionally permissible reason for this right to be restricted.

Explanation: This right was discussed at length in recitals [12]-[35] of the case Librerepublic v Christadelphians & Providence rock [2021], UCN Tribunal 5. Whilst this right is guaranteed, it may be limited by other Constitutional provisions as was the case where the necessity of judicial independence overrode the right to join a political party for sitting judges.

SECTION 2

As every resident has the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief it flows logically that any attempt to use religious belief to restrict access on any grounds constitutes a breach of the freedom to manifest that belief in observance and practice. By using religion as a test to restrict access to a political party, Ewereni has begun to erode this freedom at its edges. The result of Ewereni’s actions is that others may feel less able to express their religious identity or beliefs, which manifests in an unreasonable infringement of this freedom.
We assert that the main freedom breached is the ‘Freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination’. The facts clearly demonstrate that Ewereni used The thaindom of the shire’s religious belief as a test to deny membership in a political party, a right which is granted under the Constitution (see: 27.1 – Any resident may found of join a political party).
We are arguing that religious belief should be a protected characteristic. Firstly, we believe that one shouldn’t be able to discriminate based on a Constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom, in the case thought, conscience, religion or belief. Additionally, in the IABDA, ‘Religious belief and activity’ is a protected characteristic, the Criminal Code Act 2020 in section 4.3.2 classifies ‘religious belief or activity’ as a protected personal characteristic or attribute and Section 9 of the Constitution of South Africa lists ‘religion, conscience & belief as prohibited grounds of discrimination. Should the Supreme Court find religious belief a protected characteristic, we believe the case is proven simply on the facts.
Additionally, we assert that Ewereni’s post submitted in the case brief constituted bullying. Whilst Ewereni was outlining the reasoning for rejecting The thaindom of the shire’s membership based on religious belief, Ewereni ended the post with OUR PARTY DOESN’T WANT YOU. This was unnecessary and accomplished little else other than to cause distress and make The thaindom of the shire feel less valued. This is consistent with the definition of bullying outlined in Section 1.
Additionally, we assert that the Conservative Christian Alliance’s statement in their party manifesto that ‘The CCA does not support homosexuality…transgenderism or feminism and believes the above practices should, at the least not be protected by anti-discrimination laws, and preferably criminalized’, is not Constitutional under the freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination. The IABDA states ‘sex, sexual orientation and gender identity’ as a protected characteristics, the Criminal Code Act 2020 in section 4.3.2 classifies ‘sex and sexual orientation’ as a protected personal characteristic or attribute and the Constitution of South Africa lists ‘gender, sex & sexual orientation’ as prohibited grounds of discrimination. The proposal to remove discrimination protections and to criminalise these characteristics proposes to treat someone unfavourably because of a personal characteristic or attribute which amounts to discrimination and is therefore unconstitutional.

SECTION 3

We are seeking for the Court to rule that:

1. Ewereni’s comments attempted to constrain The thaindom of the shire’s freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief and to rule that religious belief may not be used as a test for determining membership of a political party.

2. Ewereni’s comment shall be characterised as bullying and discriminatory conduct. We request that Ewereni issues an official apology and that the offending post be suppression or removed. 

3. That the Conservative Christian Alliance’s proposal to remove discrimination protections and criminalise ‘homosexuality, transgenderism and feminism’ breaches the constitutional freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination and that their religious test for determining membership also be ruled as unconstitutional and due to these successive breaches, have the party deregistered.

On November 1, the defendant was notified of the plaintiff's first submission, and was given a period of 3 business days to answer what is, in his view, the scope that should be given to the aforementioned constitutional rights. However, the defendant through his legal representative, Eco-Paris Reformation, requested an extension of the term for 2 additional business days, which were granted. His response was received on November 8 as follows:

On November 8, the plaintiff was notified of the defendant's response, and was given 3 business days to submit his final submission. However, on November 11 the plaintiff, through his legal representative, requested an extension of the term for 2 additional business days, which were granted. The plaintiff's final submission was sent on November 13 as follows:

"REPLY

Re: Definition on Bullying & Discrimination

To say that I am perplexed by Eco-Paris Reformation's reponse is an understatement. Whilst it is true that no definitions of bullying & discrimination are written into the Constitution, that is not to say that these words are without meaning or legal application and it is the Court's duty to define and apply this scope. Definitions have been regularly defined and applied by the Courts of this Region and this practice should of course continue to enable to proper functioning of our system of governance!

We implore the Court to disregard the 'standardize rule of definitions' argument made by Eco-Paris Reformation as having no basis in regional law. We also believe that where Eco-Paris Reformation mentions Eluney, they actually mean myself, Librerepublic.

Re: Article 27.1

Regarding Article 27.1 Eco-Paris Reformation wrote: 'While the constitutional scope is obvious in the depiction [of Article 27.1], it is without foundation and might be overturned by the Political Parties Act 2019 (2.2. a political party's leadership may exercise discretion in determining its membership).'

This is an erroneous interpretation and application of Constitutional Law. Article 1.1 of the Constitution says '1.1 This constitution is the highest legal authority of the Union of Christian Nations and all other laws in conflict, to the extent of the inconsistency, shall be null and void.'

Article 27.1 cannot be overtuned by the Political Parties Act as the later is a law and a law is be null and void to the degree that it is inconsistent with the Constitutions (see Article 1.1). I implore the Court to ignore this argument.

Re: Freedom of Association

Whilst I agree with Eco-Paris Reformation that 'The CCA also has freedom of association, which means they may associate with anybody they choose and can also choose not to associate with others.', that right cannot be exercised at the expense of another right or freedom, in this case the 'freedom from all forms of bullying & discrimination'.

END OF SUBMISSION”.

On November 15, the plaintiff's final submission was notified to the defendant, who was given 3 business days to answer it through his final submission. It was sent on November 17 by updating the Dispatch of its first submission.

On November 18, the period of 10 business days that the UCN Judiciary Standard Procedure grants for the publication of the ruling began. However, and given the complexity of the case and the necessary intervention of the 3 judges of the Supreme Court in its decision, the term was extended by 5 additional business days, which expired on December 8, the date on which this ruling is hereby published.

This case raises a number of interrelated areas for this Supreme Court to consider which can be classified into four broad areas.

The questions before this Supreme Court are:

1. Does this case meet the requirements for this Supreme Court to be able to judge on the legal dispute raised by The thaindom of the shire?
2. What is the scope of the constitutional rights of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (article 4.1.1 of the Constitution)?
3. What is the scope of the constitutional right of freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination (article 4.1.4 of the Constitution)?
4. What is the scope of the constitutional right that any resident have to found or join a political party (article 27.1 of the Constitution)?

Vote of Chief Justice Eluney, to which Associate Judges Austrin and Christadelphians fully adheres.

Area 1 - Does this case meet the requierements for this Supreme Court to be able to judge on the legal dispute raised by The thaindom of the shire?

[1] Article 18.1 of the Constitution of the UCN establishes that: “Anyone may request for a dispute or legal question to be heard by The Judiciary”.

[2] Although it is true that the aforementioned article (as well as no other part of the Constitution) does not establish the requirements for a legal dispute or request for interpretation to be attended by the Judiciary, those requirements were established in the precedent "Ecclestia re: Scope of judicial independence and related matters [2020], UCN Tribunal 1". In said precedent, former Chief Justice Christadelphians stated in Recital [4]: “(...) A reasonable question in law shall be, on a prima facie basis, substantiated and not frivilous”. Then, in Recital [5] of said ruling, the former Chief Justice summarized the essential factors that must be met for a case to be heard by the Judiciary, which are transcribed below:

Essential Factors
1) The request must be a question of either
(a) Interpretation of a law or
(b) The application of a law or
(c) Both.
2) The request must be a reasonable question in law meaning it should be, prima facie:
a) Substantiated and
b) Not frivilous.
4) The request should be based in law which includes the constitution, treaties and agreements, legislation, common law and executive policy.

[3] This current case is clearly a legal dispute that raises questions of constitutional interpretation followed by questions of application of the law. The questions are reasonable as they are substantiated, through reference to specific articles of the Constitution and are not frivilous.

[4] However, the following clarification can be made. The mentioned judicial precedent was reasoned based on the old regional Constitution. The new Constitution of the UCN lists the cases that must be tried by the Supreme Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction (article 20.1 of the Constitution). This case presents at least 2 of the characteristics that enable the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, namely: (i) the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters arising under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation; (ii) the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters where an Elder, the Speaker or a Judge is a party.

[5] Given the complexity of the case and for it to maintain order and coherence, the Supreme Court has decided to divide it into two parts. In the first part (which includes this ruling), the Supreme Court will only define the scope of the constitutional rights guaranteed by articles 4.1.1, 4.1.4 and 27.1 of the Constitution. Once the scope of these rights has been defined, in the second part a new process will begin in which the Supreme Court will judge whether the defendant has breached or not the Political Parties Act 2019 and/or the Criminal Code Act 2020.

[6] Thus, the Supreme Court is competent to deal with the following case with the clarification made that, in this first part, it will only focus on defining the scope of the constitutional rights mentioned in the preceding Recital. The Supreme Court shall therefore hear this case.

Area 2 - What is the scope of the constitutional rights of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (article 4.1.1 of the Constitution)?

[7] To answer the question about the scope of the constitutional rights of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief in the UCN, and since there are no judicial precedents on the matter, I will take the following approach: first, I will present the definitions given by the parties to this case through their legal representatives. Second, I will try to give a complementary definition, taking into account the framework in which these constitutional rights operate in the UCN.

[8] According to the plaintiff in his first submission, article 4.1.1 of the Constitution “(…) protects the right to religious belief but also to atheistic, philosophical and non-theistic beliefs and the right to freely hold and profess such beliefs. This is simultaneously an individual right – the freedom to adopt or hold a belief; and a collective right – the freedom to manifest that belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching".

[9] For his part, the defendant has not attempted to give a definition of these rights nor has it established what, in his opinion, their scope is. This does not mean that he has not given his point of view. Indeed, he requests that the definition and scope given by the plaintiff be discarded, bringing to the case the concept of "standardized rule of definitions". In effect, he "(…) request that the court recognizes and considers the fact that no fundamental definition for the scopes was written. This allows the court and/or legal counsel to interpret the circumstances as they see fit. The court is breaching all criteria around the idea of the "standardized rule of definitions" by determining and attempting to define what these liberties entail. The "standardized rule of definitions" is a thorough and comprehensive method that determines whether a document and/or legal source may be used in court (…) For the sake of this case, I request that the honorable Librerepublic's definitions be reversed and disregarded. They don't suit the "standardized rule of definitions" mostly because they don't meet the requirement of being classified under a single notion that is related to all others in some manner (either directly or indirectly)”.

[10] In his final submission, the plaintiff answers the above idea in this way: “(…) Whilst it is true that no definitions (…) are written into the Constitution, that is not to say that these words are without meaning or legal application and it is the Court's duty to define and apply this scope. Definitions have been regularly defined and applied by the Courts of this Region and this practice should of course continue to enable to proper functioning of our system of governance!’’.

[11] At this point, I must admit that I share the plaintiff's point of view regarding the need (and duty) for the Supreme Court to define those questions that are requested through an advisory opinion or that are presented to it through adversarial cases as the present. Indeed, this is not only a judicial practice that has already been carried out in previous precedents regarding numerous issues, but it is also necessary to guarantee the legal security that all UCN residents must enjoy, in order to know which ones are their rights and obligations. This does not imply that the definition of the scope of a right must apply in all cases. Rights are not absolute and there may be circumstances where, applied to a particular case, they must yield to another/other right/s.

[12] Going to the central point of this area of the ruling, it must be considered that although the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief is found in the same article of the Constitution, they are concepts that although are related to each other, they must be differentiated from each other. On the one hand, freedom of thought and conscience can be understood as the freedom of an individual to hold or consider a fact, viewpoint or thought, independent of others' viewpoints.

[13] For its part, freedom of religion is a principle that supports the freedom of an individual or community, in public or private, to manifest religion in teaching, practice, worship, and observance. It also includes the freedom to change one's religion or beliefs (according to The Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the right not to profess any religion (according to the United Nations Human Rights Commitee) or not to practice a religion (according to the European Court of Human Rights). Freedom of belief is different. It allows the right to believe what a person, group, or religion wishes, but it does not necessarily allow the right to practice the religion or belief openly and outwardly in a public manner, a central facet of religious freedom (according to the Religious Freedom Institute). The term "belief" is considered inclusive of all forms of irreligion, including atheism and humanism.

[14] A good example of how this rights work in practice can be seen in the Human Rights Act of 1998 that sets out the fundamental rights and freedoms that everyone in the UK is entitled to. It incorporates the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic British law. Article 9 establishes that "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

[15] In this sense, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain’s national equality body that has been awarded an ‘A’ status as a National Human Rights Institution by the United Nations) says that article 9 of the Human Rights Act "(…) includes the right to change your religion or beliefs at any time. You also have the right to put your thoughts and beliefs into action. This could include (…) the right to talk about your beliefs or take part in religious worship. Public authorities cannot stop you practising your religion, without very good reason (…) Importantly, this right protects a wide range of non-religious beliefs including atheism, agnosticism, veganism and pacifism. For a belief to be protected under this article, it must be serious, concern important aspects of human life or behaviour, be sincerely held, and be worthy of respect in a democratic society".

[16] Now, we must determine if the previous attempts at definition are compatible with the idiosyncrasies and values that the UCN has maintained over time, as well as with its legal and governance structure. Let's see. In my understanding, the UCN is a region that, although it is openly Christian (its own name indicates this), is also a region that has historically been open and tolerant to all types of religions, beliefs and ways of seeing the world. This can be seen in part in the Preamble to the Constitution, where we read that "Humbly relying on the blessings and guidance of our almighty God, We the residents of the Union of Christian Nations, in order to form a more perfect Union, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Union of Christian Nations to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare and to uphold freedom, tolerance, individual dignity and the rule of law for many years to come" (the emphasis belongs to me).

[17] For its part, article 2 of the Constitution details the Mission Statement as follows: "Being led by the spirit with Jesus at our centre, God as our focus and the Bible as our guide, our mission is to be an open, community-oriented region shaped by the grace of God and the love of Jesus Christ" (the emphasis belongs to me). Likewise, among the objectives of article 3 we read "Be a region open to and respectful of all, promoting Jesus in every action and engaging respectfully with everyone" (the emphasis belongs to me).

[18] In this way we can see that all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution work within the framework of: (i) the notion of justice; (ii) ensure tranquility in the domestic sphere; (iii) promote general well-being; (iv) the maintenance of tolerance, freedom and individual dignity; (v) respect for the rule of law; (vi) be an open and community-oriented region; (vii) be a region respectful of all. All this, within the framework of Jesus as the center, God as the focus and the Bible as the guide.

[19] Thus, it follows from my reasoning that, since the UCN is a region that promotes tolerance and respect for all individuals regardless of their beliefs and values, the scope of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and beliefs should be the most wide possible. In this sense, it must include, among others, respect for:

(i) The freedom of an individual to hold or consider a fact, viewpoint or thought, independent of others' viewpoints. This includes the protection of any opinion or manifestation in public places in the region such as the RMB or Discord, and in private places such as the exchange of telegrams between residents, among others. This, of course, is limited to the fact that said opinions and manifestations do not contravene other rights regulated by the Constitution or inferior norms (for example, racist comments, intimidation, among others).

(ii) The freedom of an individual, in public or private, to manifest any religion in teaching, practice, worship and observance. It also includes the right not to profess or practice any religion.

(iii) It should be clarified that the rights protected by article 4.1.1 of the Constitution, with the scope defined here, are not absolute. Indeed, they shall be subject only to limitations prescribed by law or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Area 3 - What is the scope of the constitutional right of freedom from all forms of bullying and discrimination (article 4.1.4 of the Constitution)?

[20] To try to answer this question, I will use an approach similar to that set forth in Recital [7]. The plaintiff offers, in his first submission, the definitions of bullying and discrimination contained in the Interregional Anti-Bullying & Discrimination Accord (hereinafter, the IABDA). In this way, "bullying" is defined as a "(…) behaviour where people intentionally use words or actions against someone or a group of people to cause distress and/or risk to their wellbeing. These actions are usually done in a way to make someone else feel less valued, powerful or helpless". For its part, "discrimination" is defined as "(…) the direct or indirect treatment or proposal to treat someone unfavourably because of a personal characteristic or attribute which is protected by the law and/or other relevant policy. This includes bullying someone because of a protected attribute or characteristic".

[21] Regarding "protected characteristics", the IABDA lists the following: (i) Sex; (ii) Age; (iii) Religious belief and activity; (iv) Sexual orientation; (v) Gender identity; (vi) Marital status; (vii) Race including color, nationality, ethnic or national origin, descent or ancestry; (viii) Disability including physical, intellectual or psychological disabilities; (ix) World Assembly Membership or lack thereof; (x) Personal association with a person who has any of the above attributes.

[22] The plaintiff also mentions the Constitution of South Africa as an example of protection against discrimination. Indeed, article 9 of the aforementioned Constitution establishes that "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth (…) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination".

[23] Likewise, the plaintiff understands that, with regard to the scope of the right protected by article 4.1.4 of the UCN Constitution, the characteristics and attributes protected by the IABDA should not be understood as an exhaustive list. On the contrary, he proposes that this list serve as an orientation guide that, within the framework of a dynamic interpretation, other protected characteristics and attributes can be added taking into account the passage of time and regional customs and policies.

[24] For his part, the defendant at this point chose to repeat the strategy described in Recital [9] to which I refer for brevity: the request to reject the plaintiff's attempt to define it based on the concept of "standardized rule of definitions". This was answered by the plaintiff in the same terms as those set forth in Recital [10].

[25] Now, although I again agree with what is argued by the plaintiff regarding the need to define the general scope of the rights and obligations contained in the Constitution (an idea that I presented in Recital [11] of the present ruling), in this case we do have a legal instrument that already offers us a definition of bullying and discrimination: the IABDA. Indeed, this instrument gives precise definitions which were transcribed in Recital [20]. And it cannot be omitted from mentioning that, according to article 26.1 of the Constitution, "Treaties and other similar agreements that have been signed and ratified by the Union of Christian Nations shall have full legal authority in the Region equivalent to an act of Parliament" (the emphasis belongs to me).

[26] Likewise, the existence of jurisprudence regarding the application of the IABDA is relevant. Indeed, in Ecclestia re: Review of Application of the Interregional Anti-Bullying & Discrimination Accord (2019), the Court of International Law and Justice had to decide whether the closure of an embassy by Ecclestia, arguing that maintaining said embassy with the Farkasfalka region could generate a situation in which residents from the UCN were subjected to bullying and discrimination, was proportional. This, since Ecclestia founded its decision in the IABAD, since it commit to it signatories "to make every effort to ensure that their Regions are free from all forms of bullying and discrimination".

[27] Although in the aforementioned ruling, the judges Christadelphians and The Noble Thatcherites did not explicitly define the scope of the definition of bullying and discrimination, they did establish that efforts to protect individuals from such actions should be as broad as possible. Indeed, we read in the ruling that "(…) The language of the text is extremely strong in that regions must make every effort to ensure it is free from bullying & discrimination. 'Every effort' implies that all reasonable actions must be taken by a Region. This language is is very broad and instructs Regions to use every possible action to prevent bullying and discrimination. Based on this alone, if Region A is a party to the IABDA and there is a reasonable belief that having an Embassy with Region B could mean that any form of bullying and/or discrimination may come from this relationships, closing the Embassy would be a reasonable step in ensuring that they prevent bullying and discrimination thus remaining compliant with the terms of IABDA".

[28] Therefore, it follows from all of the above, and in relation to the scope that must be given to the right guaranteed by article 4.1.4 of the Constitution of the UCN:

(i) That the definitions of bullying and discrimination contained in the IABDA are an integral part of the UCN legal system, since said instrument has the force of law as established in article 26.1 of our Constitution.

(ii) That the same should be understood with respect to the "characteristics and attributes protected" by the IABDA.
That based on the provisions of Ecclestia re: Review of Application of the Interregional Anti-Bullying & Discrimination Accord (2019), and while the IABAD commits to it signatories "to make every effort to ensure that their Regions are free from all forms of bullying and discrimination", the list of "characteristics and attributes protected" by the IABDA is not exhaustive, so there may be cases in which a situation of bullying and discrimination may arise outside of said protected attributes. This may arise both from the legislation of the regional Assembly or from the interpretation of the Supreme Court or the lower tribunals, as appropriate. This idea has also already been received by the Criminal Code Act 2020 in its article 4.3.2 where we read "Personal characteristics and attributes shall include but not be limited to (…)” (the emphasis belongs to me).

(iii) That there may be situations in which an act of discrimination is justified, provided that it adjusts to the terms and scope defined in Recitals [24] and [27] of the ruling in Librerepublic v Christadelphians & Providence rock [2021], UCN Tribunal 5.

Area 4 - What is the scope of the constitutional right that any resident have to found or join a political party (article 27.1 of the Constitution)?

[29] One more time I will try to answer this question using an approach similar to that set forth in Recital [7]. According to the plaintiff, "(…) The right of a resident to found or join a political party is absolute unless there is a Constitutionally permissible reason for this right to be restricted. (…) This right was discussed at length in recitals [12]-[35] of the case Librerepublic v Christadelphians & Providence rock [2021], UCN Tribunal 5. Whilst this right is guaranteed, it may be limited by other Constitutional provisions as was the case where the necessity of judicial independence overrode the right to join a political party for sitting judges".

[30] For his part, the defendant understands that "(…) While the constitutional scope is obvious in the depiction, it is without foundation and might be overturned by the Political Parties Act 2019 (2.2. a political party's leadership may exercise discretion in determining its membership) (…) The CCA also has freedom of association, which means they may associate with anybody they choose and can also choose not to associate with others".

[31] To the above, the plaintiff replies that "This is an erroneous interpretation and application of Constitutional Law. Article 1.1 of the Constitution says '1.1 This constitution is the highest legal authority of the Union of Christian Nations and all other laws in conflict, to the extent of the inconsistency, shall be null and void.' Article 27.1 cannot be overtuned by the Political Parties Act as the later is a law and a law is be null and void to the degree that it is inconsistent with the Constitutions (see Article 1.1). I implore the Court to ignore this argument (…) Whilst I agree with Eco-Paris Reformation that 'The CCA also has freedom of association, which means they may associate with anybody they choose and can also choose not to associate with others.', that right cannot be exercised at the expense of another right or freedom, in this case the 'freedom from all forms of bullying & discrimination'".

[32] At this point, I must again admit my concurrence with the plaintiff's arguments. Indeed, a law such as the Political Parties Act 2019 can never repeal or be above the provisions of the Constitution of the UCN. In this sense, although the Political Parties Act 2019 grants discretion to the authorities of the political parties when admitting affiliates, said discretion cannot be exercised in violation of constitutional guarantees.

[33] To end this point and set the scope of article 27.1 of the Constitution (right discussed at length in the case Librerepublic v Christadelphians & Providence rock [2021], UCN Tribunal 5), the following is established:

(i) The general principle of article 27.1 is that any resident has the right to found or join a political party.

(ii) Although the Political Parties Act 2019 empowers the authorities of political parties to exercise discretion when accepting affiliations, such discretion must be exercised in compliance with constitutional guarantees. Notwithstanding this, and in cases where doubts arise about the application of the right of admission to a political party (either because it has been exercised through discrimination or for other reasons), it will be the power of the Supreme Court to determine whether it was carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the UCN.

(iii) The constitutional right of article 27.1 may be restricted in special cases. For this, the reasonableness standard set forth in Recitals [25] and [26] in Librerepublic v Christadelphians & Providence rock [2021], UCN Tribunal 5 must be met.

[34] Therefore, this Supreme Court defines that:

(i) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 4.1.1 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Recital [19] of this ruling.

(ii) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 4.1.4 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Recital [28] of this ruling.

(iii) The scope of the rights guaranteed in article 27.1 must be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Considering [33] of this ruling.

This hereby marks the end of the case of The thaindom of the shire v Ewereni [2021], UCN Supreme Court 2 (Part 1).

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The thaindom of the shire

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