Commonwealth of Liberty

OsivoII wrote:

| TWENTY-NINTH OF NOVEMBER | 十一月二十九日 |

| 1971 |

| 8am |

PRC ★ PEOPLES’ REPUBLIC OF CHINA
中华人民共和国  |

CHINESE SOLDIERS CROSS THE SINO-SIAM LINE:
THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S VOLUNTEER STRIKES THE SINO-SIAM BORDER FOR THE LIBERATION OF LAOS ALONGSIDE THE PATHET LAO!
中国士兵跨越中暹线：中国人民志愿军沿巴寮河进攻中暹边境，解放老挝!

THE ELEPHANT SHUDDERS
November 29, 1971

| Though enemies ideologically, there had been something of an understanding between Siam and China that the only physical conflict between the two Asian powers was proxy war in Vietnam. Siam had been the primary Asian partner of South Vietnam both in terms of contributed manpower and equipment; likewise, China had poured men and weapons into the North. And so, while Siam kept a fairly sizable garrison on its northern border with China following the liberation of Laos from the Pathet Lao, the bulk of Siamese forces in her new easternmost province were dedicated to the major cities, and the eastern portions where Pathet Lao holdouts were being openly backed by Ho Chi Minh and the Chinese forces in Vietnam. |

| A strike from the north, therefore, came as quite a shock to the Royal Siamese Armed Forces. An outright military attack was unexpected, however, the Armed Forces and military police were on the ready after the Vientiane riot. Many of the Pathet Lao entering from the north to speak with Laotian civilians were apprehended indefinitely by Siamese forces, though some slipped through the cracks and were able to garner sympathy from those frustrated by Siamese rule, and more recently, the harsh rule of Governor Vang Pao. Hundreds pledged to shelter Pathet Lao and CPV forces should they establish a foothold in the north, and filter any useful information they came across to them. |

| Also proving a thorn in the Pathet Lao's side, particularly here in the rugged north, were the Hmong battalions. The Hmong had long been seen as a people that could be effectively employed in the fight against Pathet Lao insurgents and North Vietnam - their anger and passion had been further stoked by their fellow Hmong, Vang Pao, who had told them that King Rama had promised a Hmong homeland should South Vietnam and her pro-West allies emerge victorious in the Vietnam War. Though not as well-trained or equipped as their Siamese counterparts, these warriors possessed a fervour and a knowledge of the mountainous north of Laos that was unmatched. Fledgling hillside bunkers and forts had already begun construction, and some had been completed, by the time the CPV and Pathet Lao began their assault in late November. |

| The cold dry season was in full swing on November 29, sparing the CPV and Pathet Lao from lashing rains, but subjecting them to cold nights in the mountains, approaching freezing point in the highest reaches. Nevertheless, the northern forts of mainly Hmong irregulars, trained in counter-insurgency and guerrilla fighting more than conventional warfare, would soon be warmed by Chinese and Pathet Lao fire. |

| PLAAF aircraft would find a mix of Siamese and American troops and equipment in the forts of Boten, Lantouy, and Panghai. Air superiority was established fairly quickly as there was no real reason for Siamese and American aircraft to be in the air away from the eastern border with North Vietnam. Naturally the PLAAF were warned over radio in Mandarin, Siamese, and English to leave Siamese airspace, before being targeted by M42 Duster anti-air vehicles and stationary anti-air guns. As alarms rang across the northwest and northeast of Laos, some 20,000 Hmong irregulars were equipped with their favoured M1 Carbines, M1911s, and a MANPAD and M60 in each squad, and ordered to scatter throughout towns and villages, as well as along forested roads between them, to lie in wait for major Chinese action before striking. |

| The communist forces would find an early victory in Muang Sing, facing around 200 Siamese loyalists. With the Pathet Lao forming the spearhead of the town's invasion, communications units just past the Panghai Border Crossing would receive word of scattered groups of Siamese exchanging fire with the Pathet Lao, though not in considerable numbers. With the Siamese forces thinned out after an hour or two of fighting, the CPV would find flooding into the town and killing those Siamese remaining, or forcing them to surrender, to be relatively easy. The greatest threat came from light machine gun troops stationed on top of and behind homes of local residents. |

| The capital of the eponymous district, Luang Namtha was quite a bit more fortified than Muang Sing, though still outnumbered by the Chinese forces waiting to enter. Pathet Lao screening the area were immediately met with small arms fire, radioing in the presence of at least one thousand Siamese troops, including anti-air guns, snipers, and potentially armoured vehicles. Any vehicles entering would also be met with the enthusiastic greeting of M72 LAW anti-tank rocket launchers. |

| Further east, in the villages and towns of Ban Souanteng, Ban Xiengsiao, Ban Dongneng, and Ban Nagnao, Pathet Lao and CPV forces would find opposition mainly from angry civilians with brooms and farm equipment. Nhot Ou, as a town of decent size, unsurprisingly had the biggest garrison of actual soldiers, with 500 or so in the area exchanging fire and hunkering down. |

| Boun Neua, deep in the mountains and part of the territory promised to the Hmong, would likely prove to be the most difficult theatre of the CPV's northern incursion, at least at first. The Hmong troops under Siamese and American training had been deployed mainly in mountainous areas, to acclimatise and make any North Vietnamese incursions a nightmare. There would be an eerie silence as the 7th CPV and Kan Podpony Company approached Boun Neua, before they were suddenly rained on by 105 mm howitzers a mile or so from the town. A minute later the communists would take fire from an unknown number of enemies from the hills and brush around but not behind them, seemingly from small arms. |

| After news of the skirmishes reached Krung Thep, the Siamese government held an emergency meeting to discuss further plans to defend Laos from communist aggression. Assuming Chinese involvement but without concerete proof just yet, the government has held out on making a complaint to the United Nations, but nevertheless Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti and King Rama IX have requested to speak with President Nixon, to discuss further assistance in the face of "Red Chinese aggression". |

SHŌWA 47 | APRIL 1972
日米関係


JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS

  P A I N F U L    R E A P P R A I S A L  

君が代は 千代に八千代に 細石の 巌と為りて 苔の生すまで	May your reign Continue for a thousand, eight thousand generations, Until the tiny pebbles Grow into massive boulders Lush with moss

NAGATACHŌ — AFTERNOON
_{TOKYO, Nippon-Nihon}

| It has been nine months since the first of the “Nixon shocks” that wreaked havoc on Japan-U.S. relations, and a painful reappraisal is still underway. It is not yet clear which path Japan will take. However, observers are concerned about precedents in Japanese history for unexpected developments in national leadership after long periods of political management. From the events that marked the history of Japan, such as its isolationist policy in the 17th century, its resurgence two centuries after MATTHEW C. PERRY’s visit, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the post-war turn to the United States, each followed a consensus that was reached slowly, indirectly, and not through open debate. RICHARD NIXON’s unilateral shifts toward China, the yen, and textiles in 1972 appear to reflect hostility toward EISAKU SATO, who reneged on his 1969 promise to restrict textile exports after Nixon promised the Okinawa reversion. |

| So far, the Japanese have given a relatively moderate response. There is a restriction on foreign policy consultations with America: in Hanoi, a Japanese trade issue suddenly arose, which later sent a similar mission to Tokyo. Despite U.S. opposition, Mongolia was officially recognized. The government promoted efforts to improve relations with Red China and the U.S.S.R. Communist Chinese oppose negotiations with the Prime Minister. But the three top candidates to succeed the Prime Minister — Foreign Minister TAKEO FUKUDA, Trade Minister KAKUEI TANAKA, and former Foreign Minister MASAYOSHI OHIRA — are in favor of rapprochement with Beijing at the expense of Taiwan. Japanese options are therefore limited in exploring a new role for the multipolar world that NIXON envisions. At this moment it is impossible for there to be a reversal of alliances, exchanging Washington for Moscow or Beijing. |

| Japan’s dependence on the U.S. results in a third of its trade and a fundamental role in its defenses, both conventional and nuclear. However, a consensus was reached that Japan should expand its options, thus reducing its dependence on the Americans: they are diversification and more efficient control of raw material sources through direct investment abroad. Production and exports of conventional weapons are being increased under Japan’s new five-year defense plan. Washington is being encouraged to reduce the number of troops and bases in Japan, rather than asking for support costs or weapons purchases. The planned visit to Tokyo of NIXON’s security adviser. HENRY KISSINGER could help change the current atmosphere between the two countries. A visit from the President would be more appreciated as it coincided with or followed the May 15 reversion of Okinawa. However, the alienation of Washington’s most important ally in Asia is unlikely to be reversed without a long-term effort to establish a relationship based on close consultation and an equal partnership to resolve global problems. |